640

THE "EXPRESS"

PRINTING CO. v. COPELAND.

part Vaterworks Co. v. Potter, 7 H. &
N. 160; Pennington v. Brinsop Hall
Coal Co., L. R., 5 Ch. Div. 769.
The reason in one and all is the same,
he must not allow such things to escape
from his own control and premises to
another's detriment. Whether positive
negligence must be proved in any or all
the above illustrations is immaterial upon
the precise point we are now considering.
The true cause of action therefore in
Ballard v. Tomlinson, is not exactly that
the defendants contaminated underground
percolating water, but that he allowed

his impure sewage to escape from his
premises to the plaintiff's, and the circumstance that it reached there by underground percolation instead of by a surface stream is quite immaterial. The
mode of transmission is unimportant.
In this view of the case the decision in
Ballard v. Tomlinson is clearly right,
and quite in harmony with well-established principles on both sides of the
Atlantic.
.EDMUND H. BENETr.

Boston.
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When one becomes a candidate for public office, conferred by popular election, he
is considered as putting his character in issue, so far as respects his qualifications for
the office. Whatever pertains to the qualifications of the candidate for the office
sought is a legitimate subject for discussion and comment, but statements and comments made must be confined to the truth, or what, in good faith and upon probable
cause, is believed to be true, and the matter must relate to the suitableness or unfitness of the candidate for the office.
If the matter published be true, and is justified by the occasion, the candidate
cannot recover against the publisher. If the matter be not justified by the occasion,
then, whether true or false, the publisher is not relieved from liability, because the
party was a candidate for public office ; though the matter may be justified by the
occasion. If it be false, a right of action accrues against the publisher, to defeat
which the burden would be on him to show that publication was made in good faith,
in the honest belief of its truthfulness, and that there were just and reasonable
grounds for entertaining that belief.
In suits for libel, when defendant has asserted several inconsistent pleas in his
answer, inter alia, one justifying by asserting the truth of the alleged libellous matter, the failure to establish such plea is not to be taken as tending tp establish malice,
and to aggravate the injury done defendant.

from Bexar County.
This suit was brought by appellee against appellant, alleging that
on January 7th 1883, appellee was a candidate for mayor of the
city of San Antonio, the election for which was had January 8th
1883; that appellant published in its newspaper, the "San Antonio
Express," a false, wicked and malicious libel, with the intent, and
for the purpose of injuring him, to wit :
APPEAL
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" As Mr. Copeland is a candidate for mayor, and as that officer
has the general management of our finances, it is a legitimate question for the people to ask how lie has managed affairs of others
heretofore placed in his hands. We know very little of such transactions, though the records show one case that may give some valuable hints to the voters. We will state the facts, allowing the
reader to make his own comments: In 1881 T. P. Aplin died, and
Mr. Copeland was appointed administrator of his little estate, the
total valuation of which was $2579.90. The administration was
closed November 23d, and the report shows a total expense of
administering on the estate of $2579.90 to have been $882.28, and
the administrator was allowed to retain the balance of the estate
$1777.62, subject to the order and instruction of the heirs. What
such retention cost the heirs we do not know, but from the charges
for administration it was doubtless a pretty heavy one. The heirs,
no doubt, were afraid to give any instructions through fear that the
balance of the estate would not pay the fees accruing for the money
left in the administrator's hands."
Appellant answered by general and special exceptions and general denial, and specially denied the meaning attributed to the statement of appellee, and also that appellant published the statement
believing it to be true; that the facts were furnished by others,
who assured the appellant of their truth, and that the same was published in good faith, without any malice or ill-will against appellee,
and under the honest belief that it was matter that was proper to
be made known in view of appellee's candidacy for the office of
mayor.
A trial had December 24th 1883, resulted in a verdict and judgment for $2500, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
Simpson

James and Shook & Dittmar, for appellant.

J. H. Aleceary, for appellee.
WATTS, J.-Elsewhere the rule seems well established that in this
class of cases, where the defendant justifies by alleging the truth
of the libellous matter, and fails to establish the truth of the plea,
this may be considered as a circumstance tending to show malice.
But our statute gives the defendant the right to plead in his answer,
as many several matters, whether of law or fact, as he may deem
necessary to his defence, and which are pertinent to his cause, proVOL. XXXIII.-81
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vided that he shall file them all at the same time, and in the due
order of pleading.
In Fowler v. Davenport, 21 Texas 633, in construing that provision of the statute, Justice ROBERTS remarks that "the general
and absolute right here given to plead several matters is unlimited,
if they are pertinent to the cause, filed all at the same time, and in
the due order of pleading. There is no qualification or abridgment of this right in matters that are inconsistent. Such a qualification would destroy the right." The conclusion reached in that
case was that one plea could not be used as evidence, or as an admission for the purpose of destroying another inconsistent plea contained in the same answer.
It would seem, therefore, that in this character of suits -where the
defendant has asserted several inconsistent pleas in the same answer,
and among them one justifying, by asserting the truth of the supposed
libellous matter, to permit that plea to be taken as a circumstance
tending to establish malice, on the ground that the plea was not
sustained by the evidence, when probable cause of the non-existence
of malice has been asserted in the answer, and is pertinent to the
causes would, in the language of Justice Roberts, "destroy the right."
Here the court instructed the jury that appellant had pleaded the
truth of the publication in justification, and if the truth of the
publication had not been established by the evidence, then to consider the fact of its having been pleaded as a circumstance tending
to show malice, and to aggravate the injury done to plaintiff. There
exist two fatal objections to this instruction. First, there is no
plea contained in the answer asserting the truth of the publication,
as a defence: Townshend on Slander and Libel, sect. 357.
In the second place appellant had asserted by plea, that the publication was privileged, and made upon probable cause in good
faith and without malice, so that in either view the charge is erroneous.
With respect to the question of privilege asserted by the answer,
ther6 is considerable confusion found in the adjudicated cases.
Judge COOLEY, in his work on Torts, p. 217, says, "The

freedom

of the press was undoubtedly intended to be secured on public
grounds, and the general purpose may be said to be to preclude
those in authority from making use of the machinery of the law
to prevent full discussion of political and other matters in which
the public is concerned. With this end in view, not only must
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freedom of discussion be permitted, but there must be exemption
afterwards from liability for any publication made in good faith, and
in the belief of its truth, the making of which, if true, would be
justified by the occasion. There should consequently be freedom
in discussing in good faith, the character, the habits, and mental and
moral qualifications of any person presenting himself, or presented
by his friends, as a candidate for public office, either to the electors,
or to a board of officers having power of appointment."
It may be asserted as a sound principle, and one supported by
authority, that when a person consents to become a candidate for
public office conferred by a popular election, he should be considered as putting his character in issue, so far as respects his qualification for the office: Corn. v. Clap, 4 Mass. 169; cor. v. Odell,
3 Pitts. (Pa.) 449; Rearicek v. Wilcox, 10 West. Jur. 681; Odgers
on Slander and Libel, sect. 236.
Whatever pertains to the qualification of the candidate for the
office sought, is a legitimate subject for discussion and comment,
provided such discussion and comment is not extended beyond the
prescribed limit; that is, all statements and comments in this respect
must be confined to the truth, or what in good faith and upon probable cause is believed to be true, and the matter must be pertinent
to the issue; i. e., it must relate to the suitableness or unfitness of
the candidate for the office.
In our form of government, the supreme power is in the people;
they create offices and select the officers. Then, in the exercise of
this high and important power of selecting their agents to administer for them the offices of government, are the people to be denied
the right of discussion and comment respecting the qualification, or
want of qualification of those who, by consenting to become candidates, challenge the support of the people on the ground of their
peculiar fitness for the office sought ? Usually it is by such discussion and comment concerning the qualification of opposing cand(dates that the people obtain the requisite information to enable
them intelligently to exercise the elective franchise. Any abridgment of this right of discussion and comment, beyond the limitations
heretofore stated, it seems to us would be extremely unwise.
And in this respect the press occupies the same position, and
should be included in the same category with the people. Public
journals are supported by and are published with a view to the dissemination of useful knowledge among the people, and the comments
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and discussions of these journals are entitled to the same privileges
and subject to the same limitations respecting the qualifications and
suitableness of candidates for office, as those of the people.
Chief Justice WILLIE, in Belo
Co. v. Wren, 5 Texas Law
Review 153, truly remarked that every "facility should be allowed
for the quick dissemination of useful facts, and the freedom of the
press should not be restrained further than is absolutely necessary
to protect private character from falsehood and slander."
It is implied by the rule announced by us that the matter published must be such as is justified by the occasion i that is, it must
be such as would be appropriate for the electors to consider in making
a selection for the office. Ordinarily that would be a question of
fact, to be submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions.
Then, if the matter published is true, and such as is justified by
the occasion, there could be no recovery by the candidate against the
publisher. If the matter is not justified by the occasion, then
the fact that the person against whom it was directed was at the
time a candidate for office, would not exempt the publisher from
liability, whether the matter published was true or false. And
although the matter published might be justified by the occasion,
still, if it was false, a right of action would accrue against the
publisher to defeat which the burden would be upon him to show
that the publication was made in good faith, in the honest belief of
its truth, and besides that there were just and reasonable grounds
for entertaining that belief.
IWhile the rule here announced seems to be just to all, we are
aware of the fact that it is not in accord with some, and perhaps
a majority of the adjudicated cases in this country. In New York
comments and discussions relating to public officers and candidates
for official positions are placed upon the same footing as comments
and discussions concerning the private character of other persons.
The tendency in the English courts is more liberal in protecting the
freedom of the press, and the holding there is in accord with the
conclusions announced in this opinion, and which we believe to be
well founded in reason, and not merely in accord with the spirit of
constitutional liberty and free republican institutions.
Our conclusion is that the judgment ought to be reversed and
the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
The authorities upon the important
and interesting question discussed in the

principal case are not so harmonious as
could be wished. In New York the rule
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upon the subject is most unsatisfactory,
and it is in etffct held by the courts of
that state that there is no privilege whatever possessed by the elector in canvassing the character and qualifications of a
candidate for his suffrage beyond that
which is possessed in any other relation.
In thecase of Lewis v. Few, 5 Johns. l,the
chairman of a public meeting signed an
address adopted by the meeting, condemning the conduct of the governor, Morgan
Lewis, then a candidate for re-election,
which among other things charged him
with want of fidelity to his party, pursuing a system of family aggrandizement
in his appointments, signing the charter
of a bank, knowing that it had been procured by fraud, attempting to destroy
the freedom of the press by vexatious
prosecutions, &c. In an action against
the chairman for the libel contained
therein, no attempt was made to prove
the truth of the charges, and it was held
by the Supreme Court that the publicaMlr. Justice
tion was not privileged.
THomrPsobe, in delivering his opinion,
among othe,- things, used this language :
"That elt tors should have a rieht to
assemble rud freely and openly to examine the 'itness and qualifications of
and commuoic 4,r.eces,
candidates fnicate theii opinion to others, is a p.s*tion to which I most cordially accede.
But there is a wide difference between
this privilege and a right irresponsibly to
charge a candidate with direct, specific
and unfounded crimes. It would in my
judgment be a monstrous doctrine to
establish that when a man becomes a candidate for an elective office, he thereby
gives to others a right to accuse him of
any imaginable crimes with impunity.
Candidates ha:e rights as well as electors,
and these rights and privileges must be
io guarded and protected as to harmonize one with another. If one hundred or
one thousand men, when assembled together, undertake to charge a man with
specific crimes, I see no,reason why it
should le less criminal than if each one

should do it individually at different
times and places. All that is required,
in the one case or the other, is not to
transcend the bounds of truth."
Alike doctrine was laid down in the case
of King Y. Root, 4 Wend. 113 ; s. c. 7
Cow. 613, which was an action by the
lieutenant-governor, against the defendant for charging him with being intoxicated in the senate chamber as he was
about to take his seat as presiding officer.
The defendant upon the trial brought a
number of witnesses who testified to the
truth of the charge, which also appeared
to have been published in the full belief
of its truth ; but the jury found against
the defendant, and under an instruction
that tie only privilege the defendant had
was simply to publish the truth and nothing more, found a large verdict for the
plaintiff. The reader is referred for a
full discussion of these cases to Judge
Cooley's excellent work on Constitutional Limitations, page *435. See also
Curtis v. Afussey, 6 Gray 261; Aldrich
v. Printing Co., 9 Minn. 133; Runt V.
Bennett, 4 E. D. Smith 647; s. c. 19
N. Y. 173. Note to Munster v. Lamb,
23 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 19; State v.
Balch, 31 Xac. 465 ; Briggs v. Garrett,
41 Leg. Int. 14.
Wi thout attempting anyextended criticism of these cases, it may be remarked
that the rule laid do,.n therein affords no
privilege whatever to the elccto,. The
sentence first quoted taken alone would
seem to concede some privilege to the
elector ; but taken in connection with
what follows, it is deprived of all force.
"There is nothing upon the record showing the least foundation or pretence for
the charges. The accusation, then, being
false, the primafacie presumption of law
is that the publication was malicious ; and
the circumstances of the defendant being
associated with others does not per se
rebut this presumption."
It is to be observed that this is precisely the rule laid down by the books in
actions for slander and libel, in cases
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where there is no question of privilege
involved.
The case of Rearick v. Wilcox,'81 Ill.

sary assumption than any other rule
than that prevailing in cases where no
privilege is claimed would " give to
others a right to accuse him [the candi77, is similar in principle, in that it substantially negatives the privilege of pub- date] of any imaginable crimes, with
impunity ;" or that "1the private charlication ; but it also discusses the measacter of a persdn who is a candidate for
ure of damages which was not passed
office can be destroyed by the publication
upon in Lewis v. Few. In Rearick v.
of a libellous article," &c., which indeed
Wilcox, the plaintiff was a candidate for
would be "a monstrous doctrine."
the office of police magistrate in the city
There would seem to be no great diffiof Quincy, and the publication comculty, however, in formulatng a rule
plained of in substance charged dishonthat will effectually protect the rights
esty and corruption, and that, if elected,
both of the public as represented by the
the candidate would improve" every opelectors, and the candidate, by simply
portunity for peculation that might by
possibility attach to the office."
No shifting the burden of proof and making
the case one of conditional privilege.
attempt was made upon the trial to estabAnother class of cases makes a dislish the truth of these charges ; and it
tinction between comments on a man's
was held proper to prove the facts and
circumstances connected with the publipublic conduct or qualification for office,
cation to show absence of malice in fact,
and upon his private character, the radiand that such evidence was competent
cal defect of which rule as is well observed
upon the question of exemplary damages,
by Judge Coolky in his work on Constitubut -not as affecting compensatory dam- tional Limitations (p. *440) consists in
ages ; that it was error to instruct the the assumption that the private character
jury that they might in mitigation of
of a public officer is something aside from,
damages consider the excitement of the and not entering into or influencing his
election leading to the publication, or
public conduct. See Gathercole v. Mall,
the fact that the article w" published for
15 M. & W. 331 ;Connonwealth v. Morthe sole purpose of defeating the plainris, 1 Va. Cas. 176 ; Commonwealth v.
tiff's election; that the fact that the
Odel, 3 Pitts. 449; Commaonwealth v.
defendant, as the proprietor of a newsClap, 4 Mass. 163 : Sweeney v. Baker,
paper, was actuated by what he believed
13 W. Va. 158.
to be for the public good, could not be
In the case of Sweeney v. Baker, supra,
taken into consideration in mitigation of
the rule is laid down as follows : " The
damages. In delivering the opinion of the only limitation tp the right of criticism
court, CRAIG, J., said: " While the
of the acts or conduct of a candidate for
qualification and fitness of a candidate
an office in the gift of the people is that
for office might properly be discussed
the criticism be bona fide. As this right
with freedom by the press of the country,
of criticism is confined to the acts or
we are aware of no case that goes so far
conduct of such candidate, whenever the
as to hold that the private character of a
facts which constitute the act or conduct
person, who is a candidate for office can
criticised, are not admitted, they must
be destroyed by the publication of a libelof course be proven. [It is to be obous article in a newspaper, notwitlstandserved that the truth is always a dofence
ing the election may be attended with
in a civil action f6r libel. Where then
that excitement and feeling that not un- is the privilege ?] But as respects his
frequently enters into our elections."
person there is no such large privilege of
Both this case and that of Lewis v.
criticism though he be a candidate for
Few, make the gratuitous and unnecessuch office. This large privilege of crit-
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Icism is confined to his acts. The publication of defamatory language affecting
his moral character can never be justified
on the ground that it was published as
a criticism. His talents and qualifications, mentally and physically, for the
office he asks at the hands of the people
may be freely commented on in publications in a newspaper, and though such
comments be harsh and unjust, no malice
will be implied ; for these are matters of
opinion of which the voters are the only
judges ; but no one has a right by a
publication to impute to such a candidate
falsely crimes, or publish allegations
affecting his character falsely."
It is quite generally held that any false
charge affecting the private character of
a candidate for, or an incumbent of, an
office is actionable. Thus, it has been
held actionable falsely to charge an officer with having taken a bribe, or with
corruption or want of integrity : iamiltonv. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; lVilson v.
Nooan, 35 Wis. 321 ; Go.e v. Bletlen,
21 Minn. 80 ; Assell v. Anthony, 21
Kan. 450 ; Littlejohn v. Greeley, 13 Abb.
Pr. 41 ; Dole v. Van Bensselaer, I Johns.
Cas. 330.
So, falsely to charge an officer with
having been intoxicated while in the
discharge of his duties: King v. Root,
stqra; Gottbehuet v. Hubadiek, 36 Wis.
515.

So: falsely to charge a sealer of weights
and measures with "tampering with"
and "doctoring" such weights and meastires, has been held actionable: Eviston
v. Cramer, 47 Wis. 659.
So, falsely to charge a city physician
with having caused the death of a patient
by reckless treatment: Foster v. Scripps,
39 Mlich. 376.
In 1Mdayran v. Richardson, I Nott &
MeC. 348, it was held that to address
letters to the electors of a district charging a candidate for the office of member
of Congress with having an impaired inderstanding and a mind weakened by
disease was presenting the subject to the

pruper and legitimate tribunal to try the
question, and was not actionable. In
the case of Spiering v. Andrae, 18 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 186. however, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin criticise this
case, and express the opinion that "1the
great preponderance of authority is that
words charging an officer with gross ignorance and incapacity are actionable
per se. In this case it was held actionable per se, to say of ajustice of the peace,
that he, the defendant, did not want to sit
as a juror before such a d d fool of a
justice." It is worthy of remark that
no attempt was made to prove the truth
of the charge. This case as well as some
of the preceding ones can he well distinguished from Mayrant v. Richardson,
in that no question of privilege was
raised in the case.
The case of Molt v. Dawson, 46 Ia.
533, seems to lay down a much more
rational principle than any of the foregoing cases yet commented upon, excepting
the principal case, and perhaps Mayrant
v. Richardson, which latter so far as it
In
goes, seems open to no criticism.
Allott v. Dawson, the court quote with
approval Townshend on Slander and

Libel, sect. 241, that "every one who
believes himself to be possessed of knowledge which, if true, does or may affect
the rights and interests of another, has
the right in good faith to communicate
such his belief to that other ;" and accordingly held that where one in good
faith and without malice, makes a charge
affecting the claracter of another, who is
a candidate for office, to an elector, shortly
before the election, lie is not liable to an
action therefor, his statement being in the
nature of a privileged communication.
The charge in this case was of having
cheated upon the sale of cattle, and directly affected the moral character of the
candidate.
The case of Briggs v. Garrett, Court
of Common Pleas Philadelphia, 41 Leg.
Int. 14, though a nisi prius case, is one
ofgreat interest in this connection, hold-
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ing substantially the doctrine laid down
in the preceding case of Mort v. Dawson.
See also State v. Batch, 31 Kans. 465,
which, though a criminal prosecution,
may be read with profit in this connection.
With reference to the principal case,
we are glad to be able to say that it has
our unqualified approval. In our opinion in adopting tile quotation from page
217 of Cooley on Torts, as the rule of

decision, carefully limited as it is in thLe
subsequent portions of the opinion, the
learned judge who rendered the judgment
of the court has placed his decision upon
the solid basis of priuciple, and has
established a precedent that ought to
commend itself to every court called to
pass upon similar questions in the future.
31ARSIZAL D. EWELL.
Chicago.

Supreme Gourt of Xew York.
FAIRLEE v. BLOOMINGDALE ET

AL.

Under a statute empowering a married woman to carry on any trade or business

on her sole and separate account, she is not authorized to enter into business in partnership with her husband, and the obligations of such a firm cannot be enforced
against her.

M TION for new trial.

Hiller & JKrom, for the plaintiff.
Stevens &lMayhew, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WESTBROOK, J.-This cause was tried at the Scboharie Circuit
in October 1883. The action was on a promissory note dated
April 1st 1876, by which the defendants, who were, at the date of
execution of the note, husband and wife, promised to pay "Elizabeth Fairlee (the plaintiff), or bearer, two Thousand dollars, with
interest, for value received." The note was signed "P. Bloomingdale," "F. M. Bloomingdale," and contained no clause charging
the separate estate of the wife, who alone defended.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the consideration of
this note was an old note, made by the same parties, for $1300, and
$700 cash. She further testified that the wife, at the time the
money was loaned and the note in suit given, stated they needed
the money for goods, that she would see it paid, that she was as
much interested in the business as her husband, and that the money
was loaned by the plaintiff on the faith of such statement. She
further said that thefirst note was executed by both defendants, that
it was also for borrowed money, and that such first loan was upon
a statement by the wife to the same effect as to her interest in the
business with the one made by her when the note in suit was given.
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Tho defendapts, on the other hand, testified that they had never
been partners, that the first note was signed by the husband alone,
and that neither at the giving of the first or the second note was
there any statement by the wife that she was interested in business
with the husband,
The jury was charged that if the plaintiff loaned the $700 on the
representation of the wife, that she was interested in the business
with the husband, she was entitled to recover the $700, with interest; and if the wife bad signed the first note, and the loan which the
note eyidenced had been made upon the faith of the wife's statement
that she was interested in the business with the husband, then the
plaintiff was also entitled to recover the amount of the first note
included in the second ; but that the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover the amount of such first note unless it bad been executed
by the wife, and she had also, at the time of its delivery and execution, made the statement attributed to her.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for the
whole amount of the note, with interest. The defendant-the
wife-h-aving made a motion for a nonsuit, which was refused, moves
for a new trial upon the minutes, founded upon exceptions taken
to the refusal to grant the ronsuit, and also to the charge as made.
The motiori for a new trial presents this one question: Are the
contracts of husband and wife, professing to be made by them as
partners in business, enforceable against the wife ?
The obligation upon which the action was brought, did not by its
language expressly charge the separate estate of the wife, It was
a joint and several promissory note in the ordinary form, signed by
the husband and wife separately, by which they or either of them
promised to pay the plaintiff or bearer, "two thousand dollars with
irterest, for value received." To recover upon such a note, therefore, as it was made long prior to the enactment of ch. 381 of the
Laws of 1884, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that
it was given in or about a trade or business carried on by the wife,
or that it was for the benefit of her separate estate: Manchester
v. Salier,47 Barb. 155; Boqert v. Gulick, 65 Id. 322; Yale v.
Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450 ; Second Nt.Bk. of Iatkins, 63 Id. 639;
Nash v.Mitchell, 71 Id. 199. That the note was for the benefit
of the wife's business was sought to be established by her declaration made at the time of its execution and delivery, to the effect
that she was equally interested with her husband in the business
VOt. XII.-82
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which they were conducting. It was not pretended or claimed upon
the trial that the business was the sole business of the wife, nor that
she bad 'any other connection therewith than as the partner of her
husband. The case, therefore, presents sharply the question of the
legal possibility of the existence of a mercantile partnership
between husband and wife.
Such partnership, or any partnership between husband and wife,
would certainly have been impossible at common law. The rule
then was "the husband and wife are one person in law * * * the
very being or legal existence of the -woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of
the husband, under whose wing, protection and cover she performs
everything." 1 B1. Com. 442. The legal conclusion, which the
same author states as flowing from the unity of the persons of husband and wife, that the husband cannot covenant with the wife
because it "would be only to covenant with himself," clearly forbade a partnership between them, which could only exist between
persons having a separate legal existence and the one capable of
contracting with the other. This rule of the common law is not
questioned, but it is claimed that it has been abrogated by the
.statutes of this state, or at least so far abrogated as to permit the
formation of a business partnership between them, and consequently
the making of all agreements, contracts and covenants with each
other upon which the existence of such a relation depends. Is this
position sound?
The discussion of this question must begin with a recognition of
the fact that our legislation has not entirely destroyed " the commonlaw unity of husband and wife, and made them substantially separate persons for all purposes." Per EARL, J., in Bertles v. Nunan,
92 N. Y. 152, see p. 159. The wife can only make such contracts
as positive enactments allow. Her ability "to make contracts is
limited. Her general engagements are absolutely void, and she
can bind herself by contract only as she is expressly authorized to
do so by statute," Id. 160. With this recent and deliberate utterance of our court of last resort substantially repeated in a still later
case (Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17), before us, we must, to
uphold a partnership between husband and wife, find a statute
authorizing it.
Section two of chapter ninety of the Laws of 1860 is the provision relied upon to validate such an agreement. The act is enti-
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tled "An act concerning the rights and liabilities of husband and
_
wife," and the section referred to reads thus: " A
married woman
(1) may bargain, sell, assign and transfer her separate personal
property, and (2) carry on any trade-or business, and (3) perform any
labor or services on her sole and separate account, and the earnings
of any married woman, from her trade, business, labor or services,
shall be her sole and separatepropertj, and may be used or invested
by her in her own name."
In determining the effect of this section a well recognised principle of interpretation must also be observed-that "it is not to be
presumed that the legislature intended to make any innovation upon
the common law, further than the case absolutely required. The
law rather infers that the act did not intend to make any alteration
other than what is specified, and besides what has been plainly pronounced; for if the parliament has bad that design, it is naturally
said, they would have expressed it," Potter's Dwarris on Statutes
185.
The literal interpretation of the words of the statute is that the
wife is thereby authorized to "carry on any trade or business, and
perform any labor or services on her sole and separate account,"
and when the "trade or business" and "labor or services" are
carried on or performed on her "sole and separate account," the
earnings therefrom then, and only then, become "her sole and
separate property."
Precisely this construction was given to the act by the court of
appeals of this State in Coleman v. Burr, 93 IN.Y. 17, see pages
24 and 25, that court saying : "The statutes referred to touch a
married woman in her relation to her husband only so far as they,
relate to her separate property and business, and the labor she may
perform on her sole and separate account. In other respects the
duties and responsibilities of each to the other remain as they were
at common law."
In a partnership there can be no "separate propertyand business,"
and the "labor" performed by one partner in connection therewith
cannot possibly be on the "sole and separate account" of the partner performing it. There must in every such case necessarily be
a joint, and not a "separate property and business" and services
on joint account, and not on the "sole and separate account" of
one partner.
As, then, the unity of husband and wife at common law forbade
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a business partnership between the two, as the common law hss
only been abrogated so far as express statutes have been clearly
indicated an intent to abrogate, and as all statutes abrogating the
common law must be strictly construed, it may well be asked, How
can a statute which authorizes a wife to hold " separate" property
and conduct a "separate" business, and which only gives to her
the earnings for labor performed "on her sole and separate" account, be so construed as to authorize her to hold property jointly
with her husband, carry on with him a joint business, and give to
her earnings of labor which was performed on the joint account of
both ? The question carries with it its own answer. Very clearly
the legislature of this state has not authorized and does not coutemplate a business partnership between the twb. To repeat the
exact language of Judge EARL, in Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17,
25, before quoted: "The statutes referred to touch a married woman
in her relation to her husband only so far as they relate to her
separate property and business, and the labor she may perform on
her sole and separate account. In other respects the duties and
responsibilities of each as to the other remain as they were at common law." This explicit utterance answers the question propounded,
and is decisive of this case. The claim of the plaintiff is that
these statutes go much further ; that they cover and include a partnership between husband and wife, and relate to their joint property and business, and to the labor which she may perform on their
joint account. The court of appeals, however, explicitly declares
that they do not; that they touch a married woman in her relations
to her husband only in so far as they relate to her separate property and business and the labor she may perform on her sole and
separate account, while in all "other respects, the duties and responsibilities of each to the other remain as they were at common
law." It is needless to add that if the relations between husband
and wife are only changed so as to allow her to own a "separate"
property and conduct a "separate business," and to receive the earnings from such "separate property and business," and from "the
labor she may perform on her sole and separate account," then a
partnership between the two cannot exist; for in such a case the
property, business and labor must always be joint and not separate;
and because joint and not separate, and therefore not covered by
the statutes, the relations of husband and wife remain in regard

FAIRLEE v. BLOOMINGDAIE.

thereto as at common law, which forbade a business partnership
between them.
Upon the trial of this cause at the circuit the counsel for the
plaintiff relied upon the case of Zimmerman v. Earhard & .Dodge,
58 How. 11, in the New York Common Pleas, which was then
followed by the court, not, however, without grave doubts then expressed, as to its soundness, and which doubts have by subsequent
examination and reflection been developed into a clear judgment
that the opinion of BEACH, J., in that case cannot be sustained and
should not be followed. It was an action brought -by a husband
and wife for goods sold by them as partners to the defendants. The
sole defence was that the action could not be maintained by the
two, because the relation of partners could not exist between them.
The opinion referred to is to the effect that husband and wife may
legally form a business partnership; but while the result therefrom
(an affirmance of a judgment rendered for the plaintiffs in the court
below) was concurred in by the other two judges (VAN BRUNT and
LARREMORE), yet they were careful so to state and assign other
reasons for such concurrence. The premise upon which Judge
BEACH predicates his reasoning and conclusion is erroneous. Referring to Adams v. Curtis, 4 Lans. 164, he quotes therefrom as
follows: "The effect and intent of the act (Laws of 1860, ch. 90)
is to remove all the disabilities of coverture, so as to enable her to
sue and be sued as to contracts, in all respects as though she was
in fact unmarried." This, as a legal proposition, has been overruled by the court of appeals in the cases hereinbefore cited (Bertles
v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152; Coleman v. Burr,93 Id. 17), and therefore all reasoning based upon it must be equally unsound. "All
the disabilities of coverture" have not been removed. The legislation of this state has only authorized her to own "separate" property, conduct a " separate" business, and receive wages for services
rendered upon "her own sole and separate account." As to a
joint property, joint business and joint labor, her relations to her
husband remain as at common law. In this present status of the
law is also to be found the answer to a further argument of Judge
BEACH, that as the wife can employ the husband as an agent to
conduct her separate business, therefore she may join the husband
as a partner in business, as a partnership "is founded upon agency."
The error in the reasoning consists in not bearing in mind the fact
that he was arguing in regard to the ability of a person to contract,
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who had no general power in that particular-one who could only
make such contracts and agreements as express statute law, clearly
authorized.- That person-a married woman-was authorized to
own a t,separate" property and to conduct a "separate" business,
and was therefore empowered to employ an, agent in its management or conduct. The agency maintained and perpetuated the
separateness of the property and business, and was therefore not
incompatible with the statute. When, however, the question relates
to the formation of a partnership, the problem to be solved is not
what ought a wife to be authorized to do further than is expressly
permitted, because the legisldtion already had is based upon a certain principle which logically should be carried further ; but it is,
what 'does the language of the act expressly permit? Perhaps the
law as it is should.be carried farther, and allow a partnership between husband and wife. The propriety of such a thing is for the
legislature and not for the courts. The former may, perhaps,
change the common-law rights of husband and wife, and the latter
cannot. They can decide that when the wife is authorized to carry
on a "separate" business and own a "separate" property, she may
employ an agent for that purpose; but they are as powerless to
carry the principle involved in the legislation which conferred upon
the wife power to own and conduct a "separate" business and property to the case of a joint business and property as they would
have been to alter and change the common law in the particular
which forbade that which the statute now permits. Innovations
upon the common law are for those in whom the power to legislate isvested. What further should be done because of what has
been done is for them. The courts declare what the law is, and
whilst upholding and enforcing all legal legislative enactments, they
must abide by the common law as it is, and not change its unrepealed forbiddings under the specious plea that they only carry out
the spirit of an enactment. It is proper, sometimes, in construing
a statute, to look at its spirit, but that principle does not authorize
courts, when they can see that a certain reason ha's led to the enactment of a statute changing in someone particular the common
law, still further in other particulars to alter and abrogate it. As
the power to change or repeal is with the legislature, the rule of
construction is that the statute was designed to go just so far, and
no farther than its plain words declare. iLeast of all can it be
assumed that legislation designed to separate the property of the
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wife from that of the husband and to use it in a -1separate" business, allows her to mingle her property with his, and subject 'it,
through a partnership with him, to his control, his management
and his contracts.
The conclusion of Judge BEACH in the case referred to is at variance with that of SEDGWICK, J., in Chamboret v.0agney, 35 N. Y.
Superior Ct. Rep. 474, 487, 488, and those of the courts in two
other states. In Massachusetts, which has a statute containing a
provision substantially identical with ours, it has been held in several cases (Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen 127 ; Plummer v. Lord, 5 Id.
460, and 7 Id. 481; Knowles v. Hull, 99 Mass. 562) that husband
and wife cannot become partners in business. The reasoning of
the court in these cases, and especially in the one first cited (3 Allen
127-see pages 129, 130) is well worthy of attention. The Massachusetts cases have also been recently followed in Indiana (.Haas
v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384; Scarlett v. Snodgrass,92 Id. 262), and in
that state also a statute contains a provision very similar to ours.
These authorities are of too high a character to be disregarded, and
should certainly be followed by a trial judge in this state, when
the reasoning by which they are supported commends itself to
his judgment, and is in harmony with that of our own court of
appeals.
It may, however, be said that the decisions referred to go beyond
the present case, and forbid a partnership between a married woman
and a person not a husband. This is conceded, and it is yet an
unsettled legal problem in this state, whether or not any partnership of a married woman, previous to chapter three hundred and
eighty-one of the laws of 1884 becoming a legal enactment, which
removes all the disabilities of a married woman to make contracts,
but does not "apply to any contract that shall be made between
husband and wife," would be valid.
There are cases decided which seem to imply that such a thing
is possible in this state, and there are others which imply a contrary
doctrine. That question is not now determined. Certain it is that
the words "separate" and "sole and separate" used in our statute
in connection with the property, business and labor of the wife,
must have some meaning. If they do not forbid a partnership in
property, business or labor with all persons, because not permitting
her to engage in a joint venture with any one, then they must refer
to property, business and labor "separate" from the husband, held,
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carried on and performed on "her sole and separate account" as
distinguished from that in which he is interested. Without this
construction, at least, of the words, they are meaningless, hnd with
it the impossibility of the soundness of the position assumed by the
plaintiff only becomes more apparent.
This opinion might, perhaps, well stop here, but I cannot forbear
to allude to another argument based upon direct adjudications of
the court of appeals. A valid agreement of partnership can only
be made between individuals who are independent persons, and
neither owing any duty to the other in regard to such business
which shall make the enforcement of the partnership agreement
impossible. Is this theory of mutual independence applicable to a
wife who is about to embark in a business venture with her husband?
In that business the husband at least is interested, and it is exceedingly difficult to determine what the wife owes to him as a duty in
connection therewith, from which duty no agreement can absolve
her and no partnership contract change. In Coleman v. Burr, 93
N. Y. 17, the case before referred to, it was held that the promise
of the husband to compensate the wife for services rendered to a
member of his family, and which services were confessedly meritorious, could not be enforced, for the reason that the wife, because
she was a wife, owed these services to the husband. In Wlittaker
v. Wkittaker, 52 N. Y, 368, it was decided that a note given by a
deceased husband to a wife for services, a part of which was "out
of door work on her husband's farm, could not be enforced against
his estate." If the husband is unable to make a valid promise to
pay the wife for services rendered to him, and which in one case
were not household duties, upon what principle can a promise to
give her one-half of the profits of his business, as a compensation
for her services, be upheld ? If the two can become partners, the
husband who owns a business and has furnished its capital can,
under pretence of compensating the -wife for services rendered to
him therein, make her his partner and divide with her its profits,
though such help may be occasional and exceptional as that of the
wife upon the farm in one of the cases above referred to. It is this
inability of the wife to contract with the husband in regard to her
services, which forms, and ever must form so long as the wife owes
duties of service to the husband, a barrier to a business partnership
between them. That relation, as has been before stated, can only
exist when the parties to it are free to form such agreements as to
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its profits as they may elect to make. This is vital to a partnership
agreement, and the duty of service to the husband would oftentimes
make his agreement with her incapable of enforcement. It is true
we can conceive of bald instances of services which the wife would
not be bound to render; but it is impossible to mark with accuracy
the line where her duties as the husband's helpmate terminate. The
pursuits and ventures of life are so numerous and variant, and the
circumstances and conditions of married life so different, that it is
impossible to lay down a rule which shall define the wife's duty of
service with precision; and because it cannot be done, there can
be no general power to form partnerships between husband and wife,
which must cover every enterprise and venture of life, which are
as various as the tastes and inclinations of parties and their situations and conditions in the world. If a partnership can exist
between husband and wife in the mercantile business, it can in
farming or in any other. It may begin with the marriage relation,
follow it in every enterprise, and terminate only with the life of
one or both parties. This radical change of the status of married
persons, subverting in fact the whole social fabric, cannot be legally
effected, for the reason before stated, that as the husband is unable
to make a legal contract to compensate the wife for services rendered to him in and about his business, he cannot form a partnership with her, which necessarily must, in very many cases, at least,
involve a promise to pay for services to which he is legally entitled
as husband.
Perhaps the argument to show that husband and wife cannot
become business partners is already complete; but two other points
are entitled to some attention. First. By section eight of the act
of 1860 (the one which it is claimed gives the power), it is declared:
"No bargain or contract entered into by any married woman in or
about the carrying on of any trade or business under the statutes
of this state, shall be binding upon her husband, or render him or
his property in any way liable therefor." It can hardly be supposed, that if the legislature supposed it had under that act, of
which the .provision just quoted forms a part, allowed a partnership between husband and wife, it would have inserted that clause
in its present form, without any exception in favor of contracts
made by the wife in regard to a business in which the husband was
her partner. Second. While chapter 881 of the Laws of 1884-has
removed, in general, all disabilities of a married woman to contract,
Voi. XXIII.-83
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in its second section it has been carefully said: "This act shall not
affect nor apply to any contract that shall be made between husband
and wife." This section is certainly significant of legislative intent.
If the aim and effect of past legislation were to remove "all the
disabilities of coverture," as Judge BEAcHi assumed in Zimmerman
v. Earkard & Dodge, why was the act of 1884 passed, and why
were contracts between husband and wife exempted from its operation ? The passage of that statute is a legislative declaration that
the wife did yet labor under some of the disabilities of coverture in
the making of contracts; and that as to the husband, these disabilities should still be maintained.
Having reached the conclusion that husband and wife cannot be
partners in business, and that no contract made by the latter in
regard to such business is enforceable against her, it is scarcely
necessary to add that any declaration by the wife to the effect that
she sustained that relation to her husband, isnot binding upon her.
In the making of contracts, all parties thereto are assumed to know
the law. If the wife had made the direct statement that she was
the partner of her husband, the plaintiff had no right to be deceived
by it: Brewster v. Striker, 2 N. Y. 19. It is somewhat questionable whether or not the evidence of the plaintiff, if found to be true,
necessarily justifies the legal inference that the wife thereby intended
to assert the existence of a legal business partnership with her husband. Her declaration, if made, to the effect that she was equally
interested in the business with her husband, was capable of another
explanation, and perhaps it was erroneous to assume, as the court
did in its charge, that if the jury found that such statement was
made, they should find for the plaintiff. It would, perhaps, have
been more accurate if the jury had been directed to find whether
or not the defendant had thereby intended to assert that she was a
partner in the business for which the money was loaned, and was
so understood by the plaintiff to assert. Of that error, however,
the plaintiff cannot complain. The case was submitted to the jury
in the-aspect most favorable to her. If, therefore, that which the
plaintiff claimed the language evidenced could not legally exist,
the plaintiff was not entitled to a verdict.
It is proper to state, in conclusion, that if any doubt existed in
my mind in regard to the question discussed, the motion for a new
trial would be denied. Careful study of each question has, however, brought me to the clear conviction that the plaintiff was not
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entitled to recover against the wife, and that therefore a new trial
should be granted.
Motion sustained.
The question of general interest decided in this case is that husband and
wife cannot be partners in trade or business, because the statute means that she

In other words, does this statute mean,
that for her sole and separate account,
and for that only, she can deal with her
personal property, carry on business, or
can only carry on trade or business when perform labor ; or do the words "on her
it is conducted on her sole and separate sole and separate account" only refer to
account-partnership not being so con- the words "perform any labo or serducted, but carried on for the joint ac- vices" ?
An Illinois statute in substantially the
count of the copartnership. The other
reason, that such partnership cannot be same terms was construed to mean that
formed because the husband cannot con- a wife was empowered to enter into a cotract to compensate his wife for her ser- partnership: Cookson v. Toole, 59 IIl.
vices ifl and about his business, is too 515 ; Mitchell v. Carpenter, 50 Id. 470 ;
remote and unsatisfactory to be con- because if she can engage in business,
sidered.
she can do it by means ota partnership.
The correctness of this decision depends In following the legitimate conclusions
upon the construction of the followinglaw.
deducible from the decisions, BaODGET,
"A married woman may bargain, sell, J1., in the case of In re Kinkead, 3 Biss.
assign and transfer her separate personal C.C. 410, said, that under the Illinois statproperty, and carry on any trade or busi- ute a wife can engage in trade, usingher
ness, and perform any labor or services own property, and may bind herself by
on her sole and separate account, and all contracts made in such business. She
the earnings of any married woman from can own the whole stock, have all the
her trade, business, labor or services profits and be liable for all the losses. If
shall be her sole and separate property,
she can own the whole, she can own the
and may be used or invested by her in her half or any other share. "She can
own name."
become a partner with another person,
If this law means that a married woman and why not with her husband. Ican see
is vested with three distinct and inde- nothing in the relation of husband and
pendent powers,viz.,(I), to bargain, sell, wife Which would prevent the wife from
assign and transfer her separate personal being her husband's partner in business
property: (2), to carry on any trade or
if she can be a partner with any other perbusiness: (3), to perform any labor or son. The logical effect of the statutes
services on her sole and separate account, and decisions in Illinois tend inevitably
and the earnings therefrom shall be her to this conclusion, and I can see no sound
sole and separate property, then the de- reason for stopping short of this point."
cision is not correct, because if a married
This ruling was affirmed by Daumswoman is vested with the general power 31OND, J.
to carry on any trade or business, she can
The Arkansas statute is substantially
do it by means of a partnership as well the same as the law above quoted, proas on her own individual account.
viding that any married woman may
If on the other hand, this law means carry on any trade or business, and perthat a wife is vested with these powers to form any labor or services on her sole
be exercised only- for her sole and separ- and separate account, and tile
earnings
ate account, then the decision is correct.
therefrom shall be her sole and separate
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property, and the decisions hold that this
confers the powers of a feme sole: Stillwell et ux. v. Adams, 29 Ark. 350;
Hyner v. Dickinson, 32 Id. 779 ; Collins
v. Wassell, 34 Id. 30 ; Countz v. Marklin, 30 Id. 23; Trieber v. Stover, Id.
731; Hershy v. Clarksville Inst., 15 Id.
128; Collins v. Mack, 31 Id. 685 ; on
the ground that she has under the statute
the absolute jusdisponendi, and probably
because other cases tend in the same
direction: Harding v. Cobb, 47 Miss.
599 ; Dibrell v. Carlisle, 48 Id. 691 ;
King v. Mittalberger, 50 Mo. 182 ; Naylr v. ield, 5 Dutcher 287 ; Knaggs v.
Mastin, 9 Kas. 532 ; Bressler v. Kent,
61 111. 426; Cole v. Van Riper, 44 Id.
58; Vaudervoort v. Gould, 36 N. Y. 639;
Brown v. Fifield, 4 Mich. 322 ; filliamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 329; Tillinghast v. Holbrook, 7 R. I. 230.
The Kansas statute contains substantially the same provision, namely, that a
married woman may carry on any trade
or business and perform any labor or
services on her sole and separate account,
and the earnings therefrom shall be her
sole and separate property (Act March
31st 1868, 4), and the courts held that
this law constituted a married woman a
ferne sole with respect to such business :
Larimer v. Kelley, 10 Kas. 298 ; Tallman
v. Jones, 13 Id. 445; Goings v. Orns,
8 Id. 87 ; Knaggs v. Mastin, 9 Id. 532;
Furrowv. Chapin, 13 Id. 107.
It may be doubted whether the Massachusetts statute is identically or substantially the same, or as broad as the law
above quoted, yet the power to engage in
partnership with her husband is denied,
on the ground that it wpuld destroy the
separate characteristic of the wife's property which the statute creates, and subject her sole and separate property to her
husband's control, which the statute prohibits : Edwardsv. Stevens, 3 Allen 310 ;
Plumer v. Lord, 7 Id. 481 ; although in
Lord v. Davison, 3 Id. 131, she was
allowed to recover her assigned partnership interest; and in Reiman et al. v.

Hamilton et ux., IIl Mass. 245, she was
held liable for the contracts of her husband, made as master of a vessel, owned
jointly by her and her husband, on the
ground that this was not a case of copartnership, but of joint ownership with the
management intrusted to one of the owners as general agent. See Knowles v.
Hull, 99 Mass. 562, and Toddy. Clapp,
118 Id. 495, where it can be inferred
that this ruling was made because the
statute expressly prohibited copartnership
business between husband and wife.
This Massachusetts construction was
adopted in Maine, because of the same
statutory provision: Smith v. Gorman,
41 Me. 405; 3"cKeen v. Frost, 46 Id.
239 ; Dewelly v. Dewelly, Id. 377.
The construction in Indiana was probably based on the statutory provision that
husband and wife cannot contract with
each other; O'Daily v. Morris, 31 Ind.
111 ; Montgomery v. Sprankle, Id. 113 ;
Haas v. Shaw, 91 Id. 384; Scarlett v.
Snodgrass, 92 Id. 262. The question
was not considered in Alabama, probably
because the statute prohibits such contracts: Reel v. Overall, 39 Ala. 138 ;
nor could it arise in California, Colorado,
Connecticut or Georgia, because the statute expressly empowers such business :
Kelly Cont. M. W. 332-342; nor in
Maryland, because the statute prohibits
it: Bradstreet v. Baer & Co., 41 Md.
19 ; Gen. Stat., art. 45, 7.
The statute in Iowa is not, we think,
any broader than the one above quoted,
and yet the courts held that a married
woman is afeme sole, with respect to this
business: Jones v. Glass, 48 Iowa 345 ;
Smedley v. Felt, 41 Id. 588 ; Hamilton
v. Lightner, 53 Id. 470 ; Laing v. Cunningham, 17 Id. 510; Russell v. Long,
52 Id. 250 ; but see Grant v. Green, 41
Id. 88. The legal proposition advanced
is, that a statute empowering a married
woman to enter into, and carry on business on her sole and separate account, or
to carry on business as a feme sole, does
not authorize her to enter into a copart-
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nership with her husband, nor to join her
labor and capital to his in one and the
same business enterprise, although she
may do it with others. Partnership is
one of the common methods of carrying
on business, and in many enterprises the
only method. If a married woman is
empowered to engage in business, she is
also empowered to enter into copartnership, because the former includes the latler. If this is true it should also follow
that in the absence of fraud or a statutory
inhibition, a wife can enter into copartnership in business with her husband.
A married woman's capacity to enter
into, conduct and contract concerning,
her separate trade or business, comes
from three sources ; first, her capacity as
a feme sole trader ; second, to conduct a
separate business by agreement with her
husband ; and third, her power to carry
on business under a statute expressly
conferring that power. The first originated in the custom of London, and under
it she was sui juris in every particular ;
she could sue and be sued, arrested and
imprisoned for debt, and be declared a
bankrupt:, Chit. Cont. 178 ; 2 Bright
H. & W. 77 ; 2 Rop. H. & IV. 124 ;
Macq. H. & W. 323. This custom was recognised in South Carolina, but restricted
to certain limits; lfcDaniel v. Cornwell, I
Hill 428; Robards v. Hutson, 3 McCord
475 ; Vew~iqgini v. Pillans, 2 Bay 162 ;
H7obart v. Lemon, 3 Rich. 131 ; Brown
v. Killingsworth, 4 McCord 429 ; Wilthaus v. Ludecas, 5 Rich. 326. It was
looked to as something of a precedent,
in the Pennsylvania adjudications in construing the statute: Burke v. Winkle, 2 S.
& R. 189; Jacobs v. Featherstone,6 W.
& S. 346; Black v. Tricker, 9 Smith
13; Wilson v. Coursin, 22 Id. 306, and
see Rhea v. Rltenner, I Pet. 105. From
the civil law is derived the capacity to
become a sole trader having sui juris,
powers, in Louisiana, California and
the South Western Territory, originally
colonized by the French or Spanish:
Christensqn v. Stumpf, 16 La. Ann. 50;

Guttman v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455 : Reading v. 3ullen, 31 I(d. 104 ; Aitwood v.
Meredith, 37 Miss. 635 ; Oylesby v. Hall,
30 Ga. 386.
The second method has always been
upheld in equity, 2 Story Eq. Jur. 1385
and cases cited in Kelly Cont. M. W.
155. The statutory method covers these
methods which existed at the time of the
enactment of the statute, but such statutes differ in most all the states, and the
powers and obligations are correspondingly different. In some states these are
prescribed by a court : Moranv. Noran,
12 Bush 303; Wilkinson v. Cheatham,
45 Ala. 341 ; and in others by a certificate of record : Adams v. Knowlton, 22
Cal. 289.
The power must be conferred, it is not
inherent under the common law ; Woodcock v. Reed, 5 Allen 207 ; and the extent of the power depends upon the
grant : Sammis v. McLaughlin, 35 N. Y.
647 ; hence if the grant does not so prohibit, the husband can set his wife up in
business, if he has no creditors at the
time: M1itchell v. Sawyer, 21 Ia. 583 ;
but the business must be a regular and
continuous course of trading, and not an
occasional act or fitful off and on, noiv
and then transaction: Holmes v. Holhnes,
40 Conn. 120; Proper v. Cobb, 104
Mass. 589; Feran v. Rudolphsen, 106
Id. 471.
Interpreting the statute by the equity
doctrine and the custom of London, the
rule is believed to be, that when a married woman is granted the power to carry
on business, she has the power to makc
every contract and perform every act
necessary or incident to that business,
unless restricted unequivocally and expressly by such staunte: Adams v. Honness, 62 Barb. 336 ; Todd v. Lee, 16
Wis. 482 ; Petty v. Anderson, 3 Bing.
170; Foster v. Conger, 61 Barb. 145;
.Tames v. Taylor.. 43 Id. 530 ; Abbey v.
Deyo, 44 N. Y. 343 ; Draper v. Stouvenel, 35 Id. 507 ; Barton v. Beer, 35
Barb. 81 ; Klen v. Gibney, 24 How. Pr.
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31;Youngv.Gori, 13Abb. Pr. 14, note;
Chapman v. Briggs, 11 Allen 547. But
it seems this is not the construction in
Pennsylvania : Robinson v. Wallace, 39

Penfi. St. 133 ; Wieman v. Anderson,

42 Id. 311; Manderback v. Mock, 29
Id. 43; Hofnn v. Toner, 49 Id. 231;
McGregor v. Sibley, 69 Id. 388.
JOHN F. ]KELLY.

Bellaire, 0.

Supreme Court of M~lissouri.
DESKINS v. GOSS.
A teacher in the public schools, in the absence of the establishment of any rule by
the school board, has the right to adopt a rule to prevent his pupils using profane
language, fighting or quarreling on their way to and from school, and may punish
those infringing the rule by the use of the rod.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
NORTON, J.-This suit was brought to recover damages for
alleged injuries inflicted by defendant on plaintiff in whipping him
with a switch. The answer of defendant sets up that he was a
teacher of the public school ; that plaintiff was one of the pupils
of said school, and that for a violation by plaintiff of a rule of the
school, in using profane language, quarreling and fighting with the
other scholars of the school, he did, in order to preserve good order
and discipline in the school and to promote its usefulness, chastise
plaintiff with a switch, inflicting upon him reasonable and moderate
punishment.
Plaintiff obtained judgment for $9, from which the defendant
has appealed. On the trial plaintiff offered evidence tending to
show that the punishment inflicted was excessive; that plaintiff did not use profane language to, or quarrel or fight with the
other scholars. The defendant offered evidence tending to prove
the facts set up in his answer, and the following agreed statement
of facts was then read to the jury, viz : "That the defendant was
at the time the employed teacher of the public school at which the
plaintiff was a regular daily attendant on and during the day that
the acts and conduct complained of occurred, and for which the
defendant chastised him; that the profane language used, the quarreling and fighting was done, if at all, one-half or three.fourths of
one mile from the schoolhouse, after the school had been adjourned
for the day and the scholars were on their way to their respective
homes, and before they had reached them, and the punishment was
inflicted the next day thereafter, when the plaintiff returned to the
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school ; that the defendant, as teacher, had a standing rule against
the use of profane language, quarreling or fighting among the
scholars, either at the school house or on their way home, and often
spoke of the rule in the presence of the school and the plaintiff;
that plaintiff was, at the time of the chastisement, 18 years of age,
and that all this occurred in the county of Grundy, Mo."
The court then instructed the jury that under the evidence and
pleadings the jury must find for the plairntiff, and refused to give
several instructions asked by the defendant, to the effect that plaintiff while in attendance as a scholar was under the control of defendant as teacher, and that defendant had a right to punish him for an
infraction of the rule put in evidence in the agreed statement of
facts, and that the verdict of the jury should be for defendant
unless they believed that the punishment inflicted was unreasonable
or excessive.
It is this action of the court which is complained of as error,
and we are of the opinion that the complaint is well founded.
While it is provided in section 7045, Revised Statutes, that "the
school board shall have power to make all needful rules and regulations for the government of the school in their district," if they
failed to do so, the right of the teacher employed to conduct the
school to adopt reasonable rules to promote good order and discipline arises out of the very nature of his employment, and the only
question worthy of consideration which this record presents is, was
the rule which forbade the use of profane language, quarreling or
fighting among the scholars, either at school or on their way home,
reasonable and promotive of good order and proper discipline of the
school. It must be conceded without question that the rule, in so
far as it forbade such acts on the part of the scholars while at school,
was not only reasonable but necessary to the orderly conduct of the
school.
But it may be insisted and doubtless was urged before the trial
court, that so soon as the scholars were dismissed from school by
the teacher his authority over them ceases, and that of the parent
is resunmed, and that therefore that portion of the rule which forbids such acts as are therein mentioned, while the scholars are on
their way to their homes, is without sanction or authority. We are
unwilling to go to this extent, believing it to be unsupported either
by reason or weight of authority.
In the case of .Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, this court went
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to the extent of saying that when the pupil of a public school is
released and sent back to his home, neither the teacher nor directors
had any authority to follow him to his home and govern his conduct
while under the parental eye. This court also, in the case of
King v. Jefferson City School District, 71 Mo. 628, sustained the
validity of a rule which provides that "any pupil absent six half
days in four consecutive weeks, without satisfactory excuse, shall
be suspended from school." In that case a pupil had played the
truant and thereby become amenable to the operation of the rule
and was expelled, and this court refused to interfere on the ground
that the rule was a reasonable one. Truancy is an act committed
out of the school-room, but being subversive of the good order and
discipline of the school, may subject, as it did the scholar in this
case, to suspension or expulsion.
If the effects of acts done out of the school-room while the
pupils are returning to their homes, and before parental control is
resumed, reach within the school-room, and are detrimental to good
order and the best interests of the school, no good reason is perceived why such acts may not be forbidden and punishment inflicted
on those who commit them : Burdick v. Babcock et al., 31 Ia. 562-7;
Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; Sherman v. .nhabitants of Charleston, 8 Cush. 160.
The effects of the scholars using to and with each other obscene
and profane language, quarreling and fighting among themselves
on the way to their homes, would necessarily be felt in the schoolroom, engender hostile feelings between scholars, arraying one
against the other as well as the partisans of each, and destroying
that harmony and good-will which should always exist among the
scholars who are daily brought in contact with each other in the
school-room.
For the error committed in giving the plaintiff the first and
second instructions and refusing those asked by the defendant,
numbered two, three, four, five and seven, the judgment will be
reversed and cause remanded. All concur.
By the old authorities it is said that

ties adopt this view: 1 Bish. Crim. L.

the authority as to punishment of a

(4th ed.) sect. 771 ; see Fitzgerald v.

teacher over a pupil is the same as that
of the parent over the child: 1 Hawk
P. C. (6th ed.) sect. 23; Bac. Abr. lit.
Assault and Battery, C. ; Pulton de Pace,

Northcote, 4 F. &F. 656; StarrV. L!/Rchild, 40 Barb. 541 ; Commonwealth, v.
Seed, 5 Clark P. L. J. 78. But such
a broad rule has not gone unquestioned,

6 b. And some of the modern authori-

even by the eminent commentators on the
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laws of England : 1 Black. Com. 453 ;
see Chitty's note; State v. Burton, 45
Wis. 150; s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 706; 18
Am. L. Reg. 233; .,ander v. Seaver, 32
Vt. 114. In this latter case it was said:
"The parent, unquestionably, is answerable only for malice or wicked motive, or
an evil heart in punishing his child. This
great, and to some extent, irresponsible
power of control and correction is inrested in the parent by nature and necessity. It springs from the natural relation
of parent and child. It is felt rather as
a duty than a power. * * * This parental
power is little liable to abuse, for it is
continually restrained by natural affection, the tenderness which the parent
feels for his offspring, an affection ever
on the alert, and acting rather by instinct
than reasoning. The schoolmaster has
no such natural restraint. Hence he may
not safely be trusted with all a parent's
authority, fbr he does not act from the inie should
stinct of parental affection.
be guided and restrained by judgment
and wise discretion, and hence is responsible for their reasonable exercise."
In another case it was said: "The
law having elevated the teacher to the
place of the parent, if he is still to sustain that sacred relation, it becomes him
to be careful in the exercise of his authority, and not make his power a pretext
for cruelty and oppression. Whenever
he undertakes to exercise it, the cause
must be sufficient, the instrument suitable for the purpose; the manner and
extent of the correction, the part of the
person to which it is applied, the temper
in which it is inflicted, all should he distinguished with the kindness, prudence
and propriety which becomes the station:'
Cooper v. IcJunhin, 4 Ind. 290.
In Massachusetts, the court refused to
instruct the jury "that a school teacher
is amenable to the law in a criminal prosecution, for punishing a scholar, only
when he acts maloanimo, from vindictive
feelings, or under the violent impulses of
passion or malevolence; that he is not
VOL. XXXI.-84

liable for errors of opinion or mistakes of
judgment merely, provided he is governed
by an honest purpose of heart to promote,
by the discipline employed, the highest
welfare of tihe school and the best interest
of the scholar; that he is liable in a
criminal prosecution for punishing a
scholar only when the amount of punishment inflicted is more than adequate to
subdue the scholar and secure obedience
to the rules of the school." This action
of the court was held to be unobjectionable; and the following in substance was
held to state the law correctly : " That a
teacher had a right to inflict punishment
upon a scholar ; that the case proved
was one in which such punishment might
properly be inflicted ; that the instrument
used (a ferrule) was a proper one ; that
in inflicting corporal punishment a teacher must exercise reasonable judgment
and discretion, and must be governed, as
to the mode and severity of the punishment, by the nature of the offence, by
the age, size and apparent power of endurance of the pupil ; that the only question in this case was whethcr the punishment was excessive and improper; that
if they should find the punishment to have
been reasonable and proper, the defendant could not be deemed guilty of an
assault and battery; but if upon all the
evidence in the case they should find the
punishment to have been improper or
excessive, the defendant might properly
be found guilty upon this complaint :"
Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray 36.
A like conclusion was reached in Vermont, except that if there was any reasonable doubt whether the punishment
was excessive, the teacher should bare
the benefit of -the doubt : Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114.
The rule, however, is well established
that the teacher has the right to chastise
his pupil moderately ; and whenever the
correction as confessed by the pleadings,
or as proven at the trial, appears clearly
to have been excessive or cruel, it must
be adjudged illegal: Anderson v. State, 3
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Head. (Tenn.) 455 ; Burlington v. Essex, 19 Vt. 91 ; Commonwealth v. Seed, 5
Clark P. L. J. 78 ; Morris's Case, 1 City
Hall Roe. 52; Starr v. Liftcldd, 40
Barb. 541 ; Link v. Bell, 3 Quarterly L.
Jr.'92; State v. Mizner, 45 Iowa 248;
s. c. 50 Id. 145; s. C. 43 Am. Rep.
128.
If no rule of the school board prevents
it, the teacher may punish the pupil within
the bounds prescribed by law, even
though he has an instruction from the
father that the child must not be punished : State v. Van Strang, 3 Tenn. L.
Rep. 19.
In case the punishment is proper the
father is not excusable if he assault the
teacher because of it: Morris's Case, 1
City Hall Rec. 52.
A pupil beyond the school-age is subject to punishment as any other pupil:
State v. Mzner, 45 Ia. 248 ; s. c. 24
Am. Rep. 769 ; Stevens T. Fassett, 27
Me. 266.
The teacher is not confined to mere
whipping ; be may impose a reasonable
restraint upon the person of the pupil,
either by way of prevention or punishment of disorderly conduct: Fitzgerald
v. NAorthcote, 4 F. & F. 656; Cooley on
Torts 171.
The teacher is the absolute judge of
the kind of punishment, with the limitation that it must be reasonable and usual,
and not destructive of the object of the
relation, or subversive, of the contract
under which the relation exists : Starr v.
Liftchild, 40 Barb. 541 ; see Butler v.
McLelan, Ware 219, 230.
The object and design of punishment
must always be kept in view. These
have been stated as follows: "The legal
objects and purposes of punishment in
school are like th*e objects and purposes
of the state in punishing a citizen. They
are threefold : first, the reformation and
the highest good of the pupil; second,
the enforcement and maintenance of correct discipline in schools ; and third, as
an example to like evildoers: State v.

.lMizner, 50 Ia. 145 ; s. c 32 Am. Rep.
128.

No punishment is justifiable unless it
is inflicted for some definite offence which
the pupil has committed; and the pupil
must understand what be is being punislied for. If he does not know why the
punishment is inflicted, the act is unlawful ; it is subversive and not promotive
of the true object of punishment, "and
cannot be justified :" State v. A3izner,
supra.
In the absence of proof the law presumes that a teacher punished his pupil
for a reasonable cause and in a moderate
and reasonable manner. This presumption, like all other legal presumptions,
may be rebutted by-proof: State v. M1izner, 50 Ia. 145 ; s.c. 32 Am. Rep. 128;
Eathaway v. Rice, 19 Yt. 102.
The teacher has the right to show that
the chastisement was reasonable, and for
misconduct in school : State v. Mizner,
45 Ia. 248; s. C. 24 Am. Rep. 769.
In one case, in speaking of the extent
of the punishment, it was said: "The
welfare of the child is the main purpose
for which pain is permitted to be inflicted.
Any punishment, therefore, which may
seriously endanger life, limbs or health,
or shall disfigure the child, or cause any
other permanent injury, may be pronounced in itself immoderate, as not only
being unnecessary for, but inconsistent
with, the purpose for which correction is
authorized.
But any correction, however severe, which produces temporary
pain only, and no permanent ill, cannot
be so pronounced, since it may have been
necessary for the reformation of the child,
and does not injuriously affect its future
welfare. * * * When the correction administered is not in itself immoderate,
and not, therefore, beyond the authority
of the teacher, its legality or illegality
must depend entirely on the quo anino
with which it was administered. Within
the sphere of this authority the master is
the judge when correction is required,
and of the degree of correction necessary;
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and like all others intrusted with a discretion he cannot be made penally responsible for error of judgment, but only
for wickedness of purpose:" State v.
Pndergrass, 2 Dev. & Bat. 365. In
another case it was held in order to hold
a teacher liable for chastising a pupil,
the circumstances must show a strong
reason to believe that he was actuated
by bad and malevolent motives, using
his legal authority for the gratification
of a mind bent on mischief: Commonwealth v. Seed, 5 Clark F. L. J. 78.
Where a person took a child into his
house to instruct, agreeing to instruct
and protect him, and provide for his
physical wants, lie was, it was held, not
entitled to turn him out into the street,
withdraw his care and protection, and
deny him the shelter and comfort of his
home under the name or form of punishment. Such a mode of punishment was
deemed neither reasonable nor usual:
Starr v. L tchild, 40 Barb. 541.
Two boys, attending a Catholic school,
were absent one day, without leave, to
attend the funeral of a Protestant child.
The fathers of the boys ascertained that
the superintendent of the school intended
to -whipthe boys for attending the funeral,
and they requested him not to punish
them for that reason. On the boys returning to school, the teacher having
them in immediate charge, required them
to give an excuse for their absence from
school without permission, on the day of
the funeral, and on their refusal to give
excuses, sle gave them a note and directed them to take itto the superintendent's house, about fifty steps from the
schoolhouse. As soon as they were outside of the schoolhouse they ran home
and never delivered the note. The next
day the superintendent entered the schoolroom and whipped the two boys, declaring at the time that the whipping was
not for going to the funeral, but for
their disobedience of the order of the
teacher in charge requiring them to take
and deliver her note to him. It was held

lie, as defendant in an action for assault
and battery, was not liable to a fine for
such action on his part: Danenhoffer v.
State, 69 Ind. 295, 418 ; s. C. 35 Am.
Rep. 216. On the second trial of the
case it was held that he had a right to
show that the administering of the punisllment had nothing to do with the going
to the funeral: Danenhoffeer v. State, 79
Ind. 75.
In a Vermont case it was held that
excessive punishment could not be justified from the fact that the teacher acted
in good faith and withont malice, honestly
believing the punishment was necessary
for the discipline of the school and the
welfare of the pupils: Lander v. Seaver,
32 Vt. 114.
Where the teacher beat the pupil, with
tie consent of the father, so severely that
the latter died it was held that he was
guilty of manslaughter: R. v. Hopley,
2 F. & F. 202.
If compulsory education has not been
adopted by the legislature, the board of
education, in the absence of an express
statute, has no power to require a pupil
to pursue a particular study in opposition
to the father's desire ; and a teacher is
not justified in punishing the pupil for
refusing to pursue the particular study;
1?ulison v. Post, 79 I1. 567 ; Morrow v.
Mood, 35 Wis. 59; s. c. 13 Am. L.
Reg. 692 ; State v. .qiner, 50 Ia. 145;
s. c. 32 Aia. Rep. 128. But a requirement b3 the teacher that a pupil in a
grammar school must write English compositions was held reasonable; and on
a refusal by a pupil, in the absence of
any direction by te parent, to comply
with the requirement it was also held he
could be expelled by the teacher on that
account: Guernseyv. Pitkia, 32 Vt. 224.
The board of directors may adopt such
a rule : Sewell v. Board of Education, 29
Ohio St. 89.
In the absence of any rule of the school
board, or of a statute, a teacher has the
power to suspend a pupil for good cause
from the privilege of the school. It is
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essential that the teacher should have
such power, in the absence of the action
of the board, to maintain order and discipline. He is responsible for the discipline
of the school, and for the progress conduct and deportment of his pupils. "It
is his imperative duty to maintain good
order and require of his pupils a faithful
performance of their duties. To enable
him to discharge these duties effectually,
he must necessarily have the power to
enforce prompt obedience to his lawful
commands. For this reason the law gives
him the power, in proper cases, to inflict
corporal punishment upon refractory
pupils :" State v. Burton, 45 Wis. 150;
s. c. 30 Am. Rep. 706; 18 Am. L. Reg.
233. For this reason he has the power,
under the limitations named, to suspend
a refractory pupil. " The conduct of a
recusant pupil may be such that his
presence in the school for a day or an
hour may be disastrous to the discipline
of the school, and even to the morals of
the other pupils. In such a case it seems
absolutely essential to the welfare of the
school that the teacher should have the
power to suspend the offender at once
from the privilege of the school; and he
must necessarily decide for himself whether the case requires that remedy. If
he suspends the pupil, he should promptly
report his action and his reason therefor,
to the proper board :" State v. Burton,
supra. Yet a pupil cannot be suspended
or expelled unless authorized by statute,
either by the teacher or board of directors,
except "for disobedient, refractory, or
incorrigibly bad conduct :" Rulison v.
Post, supra; State v. Burton, supra ; and
perhaps a teacher has no power to expel
him. Upon suspension the teacher may
at once remove him from the school room,
using such force as is necessary; and he
may call others to his aid, who may use
a like force: Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me.
266.
A recent ruling of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin will illustrate many of the
above statements. The board of educa-

tion of a city established a rule requiring
each pupil, when returning to school after
recess, to bring into the school room a
stick of wood for the fire. This ruli
was held void, because not "needful for
government of the schools" within the
meaning of the statute clothing the board
with its powers: State v. Board of Education, ante, page 601.
It is often a question with teachers,
pupils and parents how far the authority
of the teacher extends when not at, or in
the immediate viciiity of, the schoolroom or house. In practice and in principle he has the same control during school
hours over the pupils while in the school
house or in the school yard, or in the
immediate vicinity, so long as he is not
on the parent's own immediate place of
residence, that he has in the school-room.
In Vermont, it was decided that the
teacher has supervision and control over
the pupil from the time he leaves home to
go to school until he returns home from
school. This is a reasonable rule. It
designates the point of time where the
parent delivers the charge of the pupil
over to the teacher, and where the latter
yields it back to the parent. It is often
necessary to the discipline of the school
that the teacher should have such a control. Yet in this case it was also held,
although the teacher had no general right
to punish a pupil for misconduct committed after the dismissal of school for
the day and the return of the pupil to
his home, yet lie might, on the pupiPs
return to school, punish him for any misbehavior, though committed out of school,
which had a direct and immediate tendency to injure the school and subvert
the master's authority: Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114. See Murphy v. Board
of Directors, 30 Ia. 429, a case based on
a statute.
In the Missouri decision, Dritt v.
Snodqrass, 66 Mo. 286; s. c. 27 Am.
Rep. 343, cited in the principal case, the
statute gave the board of directors
" power to make and enforce all needful
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rules and regulations for the government,
management and control of such schools
and property as they think proper, * * *
not inconsistent with the law of the land."
A board had adopted a rule that no pupil
should,- during a sqhool term, attend a
social party. A pupil of thosehoolpwith
the permission of his parents, violated
this rule, and was expelled by the'board
for so doing. It was said that the directors had no power to follow the pupil

home and govern his conduct while under the eye of his parent, and that the
rule invaded the power and right of the
parent. This point, however, was not
directly decided ; but it was held that as
no malice, oppression, or wilfulness was
showtl on the part of the directors, they
wer6 not liable in damages.
W. W. T1PUNTON.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of M1innesota.
TIERNEY v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO. ET AL.
It is incumbent upon a railway corporation, in the discharge of its duty as master,
not only to provide machinery and instrumentalities for its employees which are suitable and safe, but also to use reasonable diligence to keep them so. Necessarily
incident to these obligations is the duty of frequent inspection, and the corporation,
acting by its servants in the discharge of such duty, is liable for their negligence.
By a regulation governing the employees in the transfer-yard of a railway company, car inspectors were required to inspect incoming cars immediately upon their
arrival, and if out of repair to mark them "in bad order," indicating that they
were to be sent to the "repair track :" Held, that negligence on the part of the
inspectors in failing to properly discharge this duty, by reason of which plaintiff
was injured while attempting to couple a damaged car without notice of its condition, and without fault on his part, might be imputed to the company.
It will not be presumed under such circumstances that the plaintiff assumed the
risk of such negligent inspection, unless it appear that he undertook to handle cars
in the course of his employment without reference to inspection.
MITCHELL, J., dissents, on the ground that the car inspector was a fellow servant
with the employees engaged in making up the train.
A witness who is not an expert may testify to facts within his knowledge and
observation in reference to the health and physical condition of an injured person.

APPEAL from an order of the District Court, Freeborn county.
denying motion for new trial.

Lovely

iforgan,
M.
for respondent.

J. D. Springer and Whytock & Todd, for appellants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
VANDERBURGH, J.-It

is admitted that the defendants jointly

owned, maintained and occupied a yard in common at Albert Lea,
where trains were made up to be sent over their respective lines.

The respondent had charge of the making up of night trains in
the yard, and was injured in the course of his employment, while
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coupling cars, at about 3 o'clock in the morning of November 24th
1882. A freight train had previously arrived from Minneapolis
over the Minneapolis & St. Louis road, including, with others, a
box car loaded with flour at that place and bound east. On its
arrival, it became plaintiff's duty, according to the usual course of
business, to obtain a list of the cars and their destination, so that
he might proceed to make the necessary transfers in making up the
outgoing trains. It was the duty of the car inspectors, two of
whom were employed for night service, to inspect all cars in trains
on their arrival. The plaintiff had been in the enmploy of defendants a little more than two weeks, and must have been familiar with
the manner in which the business was carried on in the yard. On
the night in question, about half an hour after the arrival of the
train mentioned, the plaintiff, who had been switching and distributing cars, brought an unloaded flat car from the wood track to
the main track, upon which the box car we have referred to still
stood, and undertook to couple them. His evidence tends to show
that as he went to make the coupling, and while the cars were coming together in the usual way, the draw-bar of the flat car struck
and overrode the draw-bar of the box car, which appeared to be
loose and insecurely supported, and dropped down when struck by
the approaching car, thus permitting the two cars to come together
and intercept the plaintiff, and resulting in his being run over upon
the track, and in causing the loss of a leg, which was necessarily
amputated above the knee.
While it may be conceded, for the purposes of this case, that
from the circumstances and nature of plaintiff's employment, in
which cars from many roads were brought together with coupling
attachments of different heights and patterns, he would assume the
ordinary risks of the service from such causes, we think, upon the
evidence, the question was fairly for the jury whether the accident
occurred from such causes, or from the fact that the draw-bar of
the box car was insecurely supported and in an unsafe condition,
from neglect to repair the same. Upon this issue the evidence in
plaintiff's behalf, among other things, tended to show that the strap
or carrying-iron which supported the draw-bar was worn, weak,
and loose, and that some of the bolts which were intended to keep
this iron strap in place were loose or broken, that it had been out
of repair for a considerable time, and the defects were such as could
readily be discovered by proper inspection.
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The evidence of the defective condition of the car, which
appears to have been previously in the possession of one of the
defendants, the Minneapolis & St. Louis Company at Minneapolis,
and during its transit to Albert Lea, a distance of 108 miles, was
received and submitted to the jury without any objection or suggestion that the liability did not attach equally to both defendants
for any negligence in respect to this car prior to its arrival at Albert Lea. This point is now suggested for the first time; but we
think, under the circumstances, the attention of the court should
'have been called to this matter when the evidence was received, or
when the jury were instructed. As the case stands, since we think
there was evidence for the jury tending to show a joint liability
for negligence in the yard at Albert Lea, it is too late to raise the
question in this court as to the competency or sufficiency of the
evidence of previous negligence to charge the defendants.
Evidence was received, under the defendant's exception,
showing a regulation of defendants in relation to the inspection of
cars, under which it became the duty of the car inspectors, if any
were found defective or in need of repairs, to mark them so as to
indicate that they were in bad order, and hence not to be sent out,
but to be sent to the repair track. We think this evidence was
properly received upon the question of defendants' liability ; for if
the car in question was defective and unsafe, which, as we have
seen, was for the jury, then such regulation was binding upon the
inspectors as representing the defendants for the protection of employees in the yard, unless it should appear that it was one of the
risks of the service assumed by them to handle cars there without
regard to inspection, or their condition, or any notice thereof. It
may have been a question for the jury, under proper instructions,
to determine whether or not, from the nature of the service in
which the plaintiff was employed, he was required to proceed to
switch cars and make up trains without regard to inspection, and
without waiting for it; but instructions of this character were not
asked or given, and the evidence does not show that such risk
necessarily Attached to plaintiff's business, and was hence assumed
by him.
The position taken by defendants' counsel at the trial appears to
have been that the plaintiff did not give the inspectors the necessary time to complete their work; and the case was submittec to
the jury under instructions given, at defendants' request, that "if
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he did not do so," or "if he did not know or have reason to believe
that all the cars in said train were inspected before he caused them
to be moved, he cannot recover." This question was determined
by the, jury in plaintiff's favor upon the evidence.
As before remarked, it was, the duty of the inspectors to examine
cars immediately upon their arrival, and the evidence tends to prove
that, it was their practice to so inspect them upon the track before
their removal. The inspection of the train was, -in fact, so made
on the night in question. There is some conflict in the testimony
as to the length of time it would take to properly inspect such a
train of cars, and it'does not clearly appear hdw Inuch time had
elapsed before the injury ; the plaintiffr recollection being that it
was from twenty-five to forty minutes. But it appears that the
inspectors had, in fact, completed their work before the accident.
The negligence of the inspectors was therefore proper to be considered upon-the question of the defendants' liability. If it is the
duty of the corporation to exercise reasonable diligence to supply
suitable and safe instrumentalities for the use of its servants to
work with, it is also its duty to use like diligence to keep the some
in proper repair. This necessarily involves inspection and examination as incident to the obligation to repair, and, as a corporation
must necessarily act through agents, the negligence of its employees
in the discharge of such duty is attributable to the corporation:
Solomon Rd. Co. v. Jones, 30 Kans. 601; Railroad Co. v. Holt,
29 Id. 149; Brann v. Rd. Co., 53 Iowa 595; Porter v. Rd.
Co., 71 Mo. 77, 78; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492; Condon v. Missouri -PacificRd. Co., 78 Mo. 567; Crispin v. JBabbitt,
81 N. Y. 521; Puller,v. Jewett, 80 Id. 52, 53; Kirkpatrick v.
Rd. Co., 79 Id. .240; later v. Jewett, 85 Id. 70, 71 ; Durk n
v. Sharp, 88 Id. 227; Murphy v. Rd. Co., Id. 152; Danav. Rd.
Co.,, 92 Id. 642 ; Vosburgh v. Rd. 'Co., 94 Id. 380 ; Kain v. Smith,
25 Hun 149; Wedgwood v. Rd. Co., 41 Wis; 483; s. c. 44 Id. 48,
49; Smith v. Rd. Co., 42 Id- 526 ; Richardsonv. Great E-astern
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In PFullerY. Jewett, supra, it is said by the court: "The duty
of maintaining machinery in repair for the safety of employees is
the same in kind as the duty of furnishing a safe and proper machine in the first instance ;" and "ii respect to such act or duty,
the servant who undertakes or omits to perfo rm it is the representative of the master, and not a, mere co-servant with the one who
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sustains the injury." This corresponds to the language of the
same court (Cilul cir, 0. J.) in Flike v. Rd. Co., 53 N. Y. 553,
and (FOLGER, C. J.) in Slater v. Jewett, 85 Id. 70, 71.

Substan-

tially the same doctrine is adopted by this court in Drymala v.
Thompson, 26 Minn. 41; and we think that case must control the
disposition of the question under consideration. In some states
the courts hold that this rule is not applicable to subordinate employees, as in the case of ordinary car inspectors at the transfer yards,
but that the latter are to be deemed fellow-servants of other employees injured through their negligence : Railroad Cos. v. Webb, 12
Ohio St. 494; Little Miami Rd. Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 41 Id. ;
Smnoot v. Rd. Co., 67 Ala. 13. The rule adopted in these and
other cases is followed in Smith v. Rd. Qo., 46 Mich. 258 ; Zfackin
v. Rd. Co., 135 Mass. 206, as applied to foreign cars in transit, which
a railway company is obliged by law to draw over its line. In the
case last cited the court say by way of explanation: "However it
may be as to other cars, the inspectors must be regarded as engaged
in a common employment as to such cars while in transit, and until
ready to be inspected for a new service." One reason given is that
the company was not obliged to repair such cars. That question
we need not consider in this case. This car was loaded at the terminus of the line, and by defendants' own regulations was required
to be inspected, and, if damaged, to be properly marked to indicate
that fact, at its general yard at Albert Lea, by the agents of the
defendants appointed for such purpose.
It is difficult to lay down a general rule which will be applicable
in practice, and define accurately the limits of the master's liability
in this class of cases. But if the special duty and responsibility
belong to the car inspector to examine and determine whether a
car is unfit for service, and shall be so marked and sent to the
repair track or shop, it is difficult to discover any distinction in kind
between his duty and that of the mechanics who make the repairs.
It will also be borne in mind that the measure of liability on the
part of the company is reasonable care, which must be determined
by the circfimstances in each case. Experience in the competent
and practical management of railroads will naturally determine the
nature and frequency of inspections which ordinary care would
require should be made between the intervals of the more minute
examinations at the general repair shops. But the general examinations which experience has shown practicable and necessary to
Vor. XXXIIF.-85
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be made of cars at the yards designated for such purpose, without
causing undue delay, while in the course of transportation, would
at least include such patent defects as would be readily discoverable
upon inspection by a competent person in the exercise of reasonable
care : Richardson v. Great Eastern Rd. Co., supra.
In respect to patent defects in the coupling apparatus, brakes,
wheels, &c., we may assume that the defendants had undertaken
the duty of inspection, and intrusted it to the proper agents. As
a rule, also, there is a distinction between the special duties of such
persons and the service of other employees who are engaged in
handling cars and operating trains. It is not the same in kind as
that of a switchman, brakeman or other operative: Wedgwood v.
Railroad C'o., 44 Wis. 48; Schultz v. Railroad (Jo., 48 Id. 381.
The service of the former class relates wholly to the mlatter of the
care and repair of machinery, the use of which is attended with
constant danger to other employees, unless maintained in a safe
condition ; and they represent the master, not in the capacity of
superior officers placed over other employees, but because performing the master's duty in respect to safe instrumentalities. Placing
and keeping such machinery upon the road in actual use, would be
an assurance to ordinary servants that the same is fit and safe, in so
far as the exercise of reasonable diligence could make it: .1urphy
v. Railroad Co., 88 N. Y. 152. So, in the matter of separating
damaged cars from those remaining in use with a view to repairs,
the cases proceed upon the principle that enough must have been
done by the master to indicate, in conformity with some proper regulations or usage of the company, the condition or character of such
cars for the protection of employees who are to handle them : Plannagan v. Railroad Co., 50 Wis. 471 ; Watson v. Railroad (o., 58
Tex. 439; Prakerv.Railroad Co., 19 N. W. Rep. 351. And the rule
that the corporation is bound to know the defective condition of its
cars within a reasonable time, is in harmony with the doctrine that
the agents charged with a special duty of looking after and repairing
its cars and machinery, pro hae vice represent the master.
As before stated, this case does not, we think, differ in principle
from Drymala v. Thompson, supra. "There the negligence of the
section foreman engaged in repairing the track, who would have
otherwise been deemed a fellow-servant with the injured party, was
held to be that of the defendants, and it would have constituted no
defence that the company had employed competent men, adopted
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proper regulations, or provided suitable materials, and an adequate
system for supervising and repairing its track. On the other hand
in Brown v. Railroad Co., 27 Minn. 162, a road-master engaged
with the injured party in operating machinery was held not to represent 'the company. It is the kind of service, not the grade, which
distinguishes these two cases. The one related to maintaining safe
instrumentalities ; the other, to the use of them.
The application of the rule, as well as the question of the degree
of risk assumed by employees, will, of course, be largely influenced
by the special circumstances of any particular case. And so, as to
different kinds of business, the amount of care required, and the
system to be adopted and carried out, are to be determined by the
circumstances of each case, depending upon the nature of employment, the extent, hazard and usages of the business, the kind of
machinery used, and the risks incident thereto: Kain v. Smith, 25
Hun 149.
A witness acquainted with plaintiff's physical condition, though
not a physician, was permitted to testify, against the objection
of the defendants, to the state of plaintiff's health before and after
the accident, and, among other things, that lie had since had a
skin disease. As he merely stated facts within his observation, and
expressed no opinion, the evidence was competent.
The application for a new trial on the ground of misconduct
of the jury was made upon affidavits, which are met by counteraffidavits, and was thus determined upon conflicting evidence. It
also appears that some of the affidavits on plaintiff's part are not
returned to this court. We see no reason, therefore, for questioning
the correctness of the decision of the trial court on this point :
Peterson v. Faust, 30 Minn. 23. So, also, as respects the damages, which are claimed to be excessive; the question was within
the province of the jury to determine; and considering the nature
of the injury, the age of the plaintiff, extent of his disability and
suffering, we are unable to say that the trial court erred in refusing
to set aside the verdict for such cause.
Order affirmed.
MITCHELL, J., dissenting.-As I understand the facts of the case,
the duty of these "car inspectors" was simply to make a general
cursory examination of cars en route, upon the arrival at the yard,
so as to detect any patent defects. Their duty was substantially
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the same as that of local examiners, employed at certain intervals
along the line of every railroad, who makes a like cursory examination of the cars of a train in transit. They are ordinary servants
of the company, intrusted with no general control or discretion in
the management of the company's business or any department, but
simply charged with the performance of certain special executive
duties in the matter of such local inspection. I think they were
mere fellow-servants with those employed in running the trains or
moving the cars.
There is much difference of opinion as to whether the doctrine
of "common employment" works equitably, as applied to the large
business enterprises of the present day, with their numerous departments and different grades of service. But the doctrine has
become too thoroughly imbedded in the jurisprudence of England
and this country to be'disturbed by the courts. If it is to be
changed, it must be by the legislature. It seems to me that the
doctrine laid down in the opinion of the court in this case, if carried to its logical consequences, goes a long way towards breaking
down this well-established rule, which exempts the master from responsibility for injuries to his servants caused by the negligence of
their fellow-servants. This doctrine has been so much and so often
considered in the books that it would be useless to enter upon any
general discussion of it at this time. But it seems to me that confusion has sometimes arisen from a misapprehension or misapplication of certain maxims or rules bearing upon this subject.
It is often remarked that as corporations can only act through
natural persons, who are all in a sense servants of the .corporation, to hold general agents or superintendents, to whom is intrusted
the management and control of its business, to be fellow-servants
with all subordinate employees, would be to relieve the corporation
of all liability for negligence. It seems sometimes to be inferred
from this that a different rule as to such liability is to be applied to
corporations from that applied to natural persons. I do not so
understand it. In every business there must be some natural person to whom its management and control is intrusted, and who is
therefore, if not the master in person, the representative of the
master, and for whose acts the master is responsible. If a natural
person intrusts the control and management of his business to an
agent, such agent, is the alter ego of the master precisely as if the
same thing be done by a corporation. The only difference is that
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in the case of a corporation there must be such a representative,
whereas in the case of a natural person there may not be, for he may
manage his own business in person.. But it seems to me that in
either case, when the relation of the employee to the business and
the master is the same, the same rule must be applied in determining whether he is the representative of the master or merely
a fellow-servant as to other employees.
Again, a familiar rule is that the master is bound to use ordinary
care in furnishing suitable and safe instrumentalities for the use of
his servants. Included in this is that of maintaining them in a safe
condition. Repairing is, in a sense, furnishing. And, as necessarily incident to the duty of "maintaining," is the duty of providing an adequate system of inspecting, examining and guarding
these instrumentalities. It is also the rule that this duty of furnishing and maintaining safe instrumentalities is a primary duty
of which the master cannot relieve himself by clothing some general agent with the power, and charging him with the duty of making performance for him, but that the failure of such agent will be
the failure of the master. This rule has been sometimes understood as meaning that the master is responsible to his servants for
the negligence of every employee, however subordinate his station,
who is engaged in performing the most common executive duties
in the matters of repairing, examining, or watching the instrumentalities intended for the use of other servants. I think this is a
misapprehension of the rule, which has sometimes arisen from losing sight of the distinction between one who is clothed with the
powers of the master in the control and supervision of some department of the business, and who is pro hae vice the representative or
alter ego of the master, and one who simply performs what may be
termed mere executive details.
Of course, in the multitude of cases on this subject with which
the reports abound, often conflicting, and frequently not well considered, some authority can be found for almost any proposition.
But I have not found any case well considered, either upor, principle or upon an examination of the authorities, which seems to me
to carry the rule to any such length. I find no support for it in
the English cases. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, which
is one of the few whose decisions on this question are anything like
consistent, or seem to be governed by some uniform principle, has
always held the master strictly to the performance of this primary
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duty of exercising ordinary care in furnishing and maintaining safe
instrumentalities for the use of his servants, and refused to permit
him to shield himself behind the fact that he had clothed some
general agent with the power, and charged him with the duty of
performing it. This is illustrated by the case of -Fordv. Rd. Co.,
110 Mass, 240, in Which they held the company responsible for
the negligence of the master mechanic in not repairing an engine,
he having entire charge of that department of the business.
But the distinction which I have alluded to is distinctly brought
out in the subsequent case of Holden v. .Railroad Co., 129 Mass.
268, in which the reasons and limits of the rule and the authorities
on the subject are ably discusseed by GnAY, 0. J., and in which it,
is, in effect, held that a track repairer and a brakeman are fellowservants. Almost as a corollary from this last decision followed
that of Mackin v. Railroad Co., 135 Mass. 206, which holds that
a car inspector and a brakeman employed on the same car are fellow-servants,-a case entirely analogous to the present one.
I have not overlooked the fact that that was a foreign car in
transit over the company's road. I also notice the caveat in regard
to that which the court put into their opinion. But, whatever
state of f'icts they might have had in mind in doing so, it could not
have been anything affecting the principle involved in the present
case; for it seems to me that this duty of casual inspection of cars
while in transit must be the same, whether the car is a foreign one
or a domestic one.
In New York the de-isions are so often conflicting that the value
of any particular one largely depends upon the composition of the
court at the time, or the ability of the judge who wrote the opinion.
The primary character of the duty of the master to furnish safe
instrumentalities is clearly and ably defined by FOLGERt,
J., in
Laning v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 532. But the limits to the rule
and the common misapprehension as to its application referred to,
are very clearly brought out by ALLEN, J., in Malone v. Hathaway,
64 N. Y. 5. The distinction between a general agent intrusted
with the control of some branch or department of the business, and
who therefore represents the master, and a servant employed to
perform some special duties or executive details in the same department, is also pointedly made by FOLGER, J., in Slater v. Jewett,
85 N. Y. 61. Neither of these cases has ever been questioned or
criticised, although two or three late cases in the same court, which

TIERNEY v. MINNEArOLIS & ST. LOUIS RY. CO.

seem not very carefully considered, appear to lay down a somewhat
different ?ule, but without much discussion or reference to the
authorities. This court has itself recognised the same distinction.
In Brown v. Xinneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 553, we
held that a station agent who had general charge of the tracks in
and about his station, and whose duty it was to keep them clear
and in safe condition for passing trains, was a fellow-servant with
an engineer on such a train. In Roberts v. Railroad Oo., 22 N.W.
Rep. 389, decided at the present term, we held that a switch-tender
and a baggage-master were fellow-servants. The .Drymala Gase,
26 Minn. 40, is not in conflict with this distinction. That case
was decided upon the ground that the '"section foreman," to whom
was intrusted the duty of repairing or "furnishing" the track,
was the representative of the master ; and this was at the time,
and is yet, generally considered what might be termed a "border
case. "
The management of an extensive business, like that of operating
a railroad, includes so many departments and so many grades of
service that it may not always be an easy matter to draw the line
between those who are to be deemed "vice-principals," or representatives of the master, and those who are to be deemed "fellowservants," as to other employees; but the fact of such a distinction
is everywhere recognised. To hold that the master is responsible
to his servants for the negligence of every employee of the most
subordinate rank who is engaged in the department of repairing,
examining, watching or guarding the instrumentalities used by
other employees, would virtually abrogate the whole doctrine of
"common employment." There is hardly an employee in the service of any railroad whose duties do not, in part at least, relate to
the matter of maintaining in safe condition the track or rolling
stock. If the rule be that all these pro hae vice represent the
master, and are performing his duty, the same rule must be applied
to all masters alike. Such a rule, if applied to farmers, manufacturers, and others, would, I think, effect a radical change in what
has been supposed to be the law. And yet this is, I think, the
logical result to which the opinion in this case would seem to lead;
for I can see no distinction in principle between these "car inspectors" and switch-tenders, station agents, guards, watchmen, and the
like, in so far as their duties relate to maintaining in safe condition
the machinery and other instrumentalities of the master, designed
to be used by his employees.

